Abstract: It has been argued in the literature that emergency liquidity injections should be conducted preferably in the form of open market operations. As we show in the present paper, this is not necessarily the case when liquidity may be alternatively used for speculative purposes during the crisis. In such a situation, non-discriminating operations may attract unfunded market participants that divert funding resources away from its best uses in the …nancial sector. As a consequence, targeted liquidity assistance may become strictly superior. The analysis might have a bearing on recent developments in the context of the subprime crisis.
Non-technical summary: The present paper studies the scenario of a liquidity crisis in a market for a potentially illiquid …nancial asset. We evaluate several policy alternatives for the lender of last resort, including open market operations and targeted liquidity assistance. 1 While earlier studies have focused on the moral hazard dimension of emergency intervention, our analysis is concerned with the trade-o¤ between exposure for the lender of last resort and e¢ ciency of the risk allocation in the private sector. Our main result on the policy dimension is a ranking that puts targeted emergency lending above an open market operation.
Our formal framework is based on the standard model of investor fear that can be outlined as follows. There is a population of investors, each of whom owns a single unit of the …nancial asset. If an investor holds the asset until maturity, it renders a positive expected return. However, there is a probability that the asset must be liquidated at an interim stage. To avoid the risk, some or all investors will liquidate the asset at an early stage, avoiding the risk of forced liquidation. Thus, there is a "run"on the …nancial market.
Into this model, we introduce a population of buyers, who stand ready to invest when prices are low. We show that a run occurs whenever the mass of funded buyers in the market is lower than the mass of sellers that are potentially a¤ected by the crisis.
Strategic investor behavior during a liquidity crisis has direct implications for the optimal policy response. Speci…cally, we show that when the lender of last resort chooses to provide emergency liquidity assistance in the form of an open market operation, then there will be (unfunded) buyers that participate in the auction. In our model, this e¤ect leads to a situation in which banks in distress and "greedy"investors compete for excess funding provided during the crisis. Our analysis thereby provides a theoretical argument for the position that an open market operation may not be optimal during a liquidity crisis.
Our results might have a bearing on the recent developments in the context of the subprime crisis. On August 9, 2007 , the executive board of the ECB decided to inject EUR 95bn through a …ne-tuning operation. In contrast, the Federal Reserve on August 17 has chosen to o¤er targeted liquidity assistance by lowering the interest charged on discount window lending. Our analysis suggests that as a lender of last resort, the Eurosystem is less risk averse than the Federal Reserve, which would be consistent with perceived di¤erences in central bank independence. Le comportement stratégique des investisseurs durant une crise de liquidité a des implications directes quant à la réaction optimale de la banque centrale. 
Résumé non-technique :

Introduction
According to the classic studies by Thornton [17] and Bagehot [2] , the lender of last resort should provide targeted emergency assistance to troubled banks,
with the quali…cation that lending should be a high rates, against good collateral, and only to solvent institutions. An alternative to this "banking" view has emerged some twenty years ago in particular through contributions by Goodfriend and King [11] , Bordo [4] , Kaufman [12] , and Schwartz [12] .
These opposing views, sometimes aggregated as the "monetary" view, say that once the …nancial system has obtained su¢ cient liquidity through an equitable open market operation, interbank markets for short-term credit should be su¢ ciently e¢ cient to warrant the availability of liquidity for any bank that deserves it. Since then, a fruitful theoretical debate about the role and identity of the lender of last resort has begun. 2 One recent strand of the literature that has received particular attention by supporting the banking view is concerned with the conditions under which the working of the interbank market can be relied upon even during a crisis situation. Flannery [6] has argued that the problem of adverse selection may make the screening of loan applicants more di¢ cult for banks in times of market distress. 3 Rochet and Vives [14] identify a potential coordination problem when lenders in the secondary market are heterogeneously informed.
In their framework, the unique equilibrium may have the feature that with positive probability, there is no market assistance for the troubled bank.
Finally, Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet [7] consider a double moral hazard problem involving the tasks of screening loan applicants and monitoring ongoing credit relationships. There, the lender of last resort has a role if and only if missing incentives for screening are the main source of moral hazard.
As an additional "banking" argument for why targeted lending may be superior to open market operations, the present paper considers speculative motives by commercial banks and their a¢ liated securities houses. 4 Indeed, as we argue, with asset prices being depressed during the crisis, liquidity is attractive not only for commercial banks in trouble but also for commercial banks that seek to exploit the liquidity shock. 5 An open market operation at the conditions of the current monetary stance is unable to discriminate and thereby makes these groups of banks compete for liquidity. The e¤ect is that some of the troubled banks will have to liquidate their balance sheets, while speculators might gain. To the extent that such liquidations are not socially desirable, the e¤ect will make targeted liquidity assistance more appropriate than an open market operation in our framework.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the formal framework, and describes the equilibrium in the …nancial market. Section 
The model
We envisage a …nancial market in which some investors face the risk of having to liquidate their positions at prices below the fair value, while others stand ready to exploit the temporary illiquidity of the market. To capture this scenario, we adapt the convenient model of …nancial market runs (cf.
Bernardo and Welch [3] ).
The model of investor fear can be outlined as follows. There is a population of investors, each of whom owns a single unit of a …nancial asset. If an investor holds the asset until maturity, it renders a positive expected return. However, there is a probability that the asset must be liquidated at an interim stage.
To avoid the risk, some or all investors will liquidate the asset at an early stage, avoiding the risk of forced liquidation. Thus, there is a "run" on the …nancial market.
Into this model, we introduce a population of buyers, who stand ready to invest when prices are low. Formally, we consider a …nancial market for a single risky asset ("the asset") over three dates, where trade is feasible at dates 0 and 1, and the value of the asset e v is revealed and paid out to the holder of the asset at date 2. Before date 2, the value of the asset is uncertain, and known to be distributed normally with mean v and variance 2 . Both trade and payment occur in terms of a riskless asset ("cash"), whose return is normalized to zero. At date 1, there is a probability s < 1 that the bad state S (for shock) of the world realizes, in which the entire seller population is forced to liquidate 6 The assumption of normal returns is made for convenience. Apart from the forced liquidations, sellers and funded buyers have full discretion concerning the dates at which they place their market orders. 7 More speci…cally, a seller may choose to either sell at date 0, or to sell at date 1, or else to hold on. If the seller sells at either date 0 or at date 1, she receives the respective market price prevailing at that date. 8 If the seller does not sell, she realizes the fundamental value e v of the asset at date 2. A funded buyer may either buy at date 0 or at date 1, or not at all. If a funded buyer invests at date 0, she may either hold the asset until maturity or sell it again at date 1 at the prevalent market price. 9 If a buyer invests at date 1, she pays the market price at that date and holds the asset until maturity. The pro…t for a potential buyer of not trading at all is normalized to zero. An unfunded buyer may choose to invest at date 1, but only after having obtained the necessary funding.
The market making sector is modeled as in Bernardo and Welch [3] . That is, market orders are generally submitted without limit. Moreover, the market making sector is equipped with an initial cash endowment of x 0 , and sets the price at each point in time competitively while maximizing a utility function with absolute risk aversion > 0. As will become clear, these assumptions imply an elastic demand for the risky asset and positive autocorrelation of the price process, which are the essential ingredients to construct the market equilibrium.
Next, we determine market prices at dates 0 and 1 as a function of aggregate 0 of market participants sells at date 1. In addition to those sellers, there may be early buyers that liquidate at date 1. We denote by 
The price p
Thus, as in Grossman and Miller [9] , the market price re ‡ects the limited risktaking capacity of the market makers, which implies a liquidity premium for one side of the market. For example, for 0 > 0 , there are more sellers than buyers in the short term, depressing the market price relative to the fundamental long-term value of the asset. We will see below that this is the only possible deviation of the asset price, i.e., the equilibrium price will never exceed the asset's fair value. In fact, as pointed out by Bernardo and
Welch [3] , the price at date 0 will typically fall below v because some sellers decide to sell already at date 0 in anticipation of the possibility of a forced liquidation at date 1.
The equilibrium concept employed in the formal analysis (cf. Appendix A)
re ‡ects strategic considerations on the part of both buyers and sellers, and is illustrated in the subsequent example. At each date, a market participant will trade with certainty when the transaction price anticipated for a delayed transaction is strictly less attractive. The market participant will not trade if the opposite development for the market price is anticipated. If the price process presents itself to the market participant as a simple martingale, she may either trade or not trade. The development of the market price is bound to the decision of individual traders regarding the date at which to place their orders.
Example 1. Consider a set-up with the following exogenous parameters:
Then the parameter values 0 = 2 9 ; 0 = 0;
describe an equilibrium, which generates a price sequence
In general, the price path determined by rational trading behavior is uniquely determined, and involves ine¢ cient precautionary liquidations unless
Proposition 1. The unique equilibrium price path (p 0 ; p
and p
v. Moreover, when s > 0 and f < 1, we have 0 > 0 and the equilibrium is ine¢ cient.
Thus, provided that the mass of funded buyers in the market is less than what would be needed to make up for the mass of potentially forced liquidations, there will be a market impact of investor fear. Proposition 1 suggests thereby that investor fear as identi…ed by Bernardo and Welch [3] should be expected even in situations where the buyers with ready money are in the market.
The full characterization of the equilibrium can be found in Appendix B.
There are three scenarios (cf. also Figure 1 ). For high values of s satisfying s 1=(2 f ), the equilibrium predicts that all sellers will liquidate early.
The endowment change in the market making sector causes a further drop in prices, which is avoided by the sellers, but attracts the buyers. No price e¤ect in state N is predicted for very low values
some but not all sellers will liquidate early. For the rest of the paper, we will con…ne ourselves to this most interesting case where (4) is satis…ed. In this area of the parameter space, we have 0 < 0 < 1 and p
The reader will note that in the case where (4) holds, there is nobody except the market makers who is willing to buy the asset at date 0, despite its price being below the fundamental value. To see why this happens, consider Example 1 again. In fact, at date 0, the buyers'expectation of the price at date 1 is
In contrast, the sellers'expectation of realized value is
The precautionary selling creates a temporary downwards price trend which is anticipated and exploited by rational buyers. 10 Thus, the market may not be able to fully resolve the temporary illiquidity of an asset, even in the presence of risk-neutral buyers.
In the absence of intervention by the lender of last resort, the strategic timing of individual market orders may cause a nontrivial social cost. One can check that in the example given above, the welfare loss, i.e., the loss of aggregated utilities of buyers and sellers compared to the second best in which liquidations take place only at date 1 amounts to = 1=12.
A welfare loss comes about as a consequence of ine¢ cient allocation of risks in the economy. Indeed, on an individual level, the sellers do not take into account the e¤ect that selling has on the development of the price path. Early liquidation, when chosen by a non-negligible subpopulation of the sellers, leads to a socially undesirable allocation of risks even when the shock eventually does not realize. The ine¢ ciency could be remedied if arbitrageurs were to buy early for prices just below the asset's long-term valuation. Our analysis shows, however, that for f < 1, buyers have an interest to delay their orders, which does not help to resolve the ine¢ ciency.
Policy options
How can the lender of last resort react? 11 One theoretical possibility is the implementation of e¢ cient price levels through outright intervention (OI) in the asset market. However, this strategy exposes the lender of last resort to signi…cant market risk and is therefore never optimal in our context. Less risky policy options include the conduct of an open market operation in the money market (MM), and targeted assistance (TA), e.g., through the discount window. These operations imply credit risk, correlated to market performance, for the lender of last resort. In the sequel, we will analyze the consequences of all three policy alternatives.
The reader will note that there is a wide ‡exibility in evaluating policy options. We do not take a stance on the question which institution should serve as the lender of last resort. 12 Policy objectives pursued by the institution in charge may include …scal concerns, price stability, market e¢ ciency, the discouragement of moral hazard, the exposure to …nancial risks, and others. The present analysis focuses on the trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and exposure for the lender of last resort.
Risks resulting from involvement in emergency lending should be expected to be evaluated very carefully. The lender of last resort may be subject, in particular, to both market and credit risks. The subsequent analysis applies to a wide class of risk metrics, including value-at-risk and expected loss measures. We will call a characteristic (:) of random variables a monotonic risk measure if for two random variables X and Y satisfying X Y in any state realization, we have (Y ) (X). 13 This de…nition is broad enough to encompass most risk metrics used in practice, such as value-at-risk, expected loss, expected shortfall, and many others. In particular, it will be noted that the lender of last resort may be risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-seeking in our model.
Assumption A. The lender of last resort evaluates the risk dimension using a monotonic risk measure (:).
In the sequel, we will refer to (:) as the exposure. Our second assumption says that making pro…ts is not a primary goal of the lender of last resort.
Assumption B. In the evaluation of policy options, the lender of last resort does not trade o¤ potential gains against potential losses.
Technically, Assumption B says that when denotes the …nancial return to the lender of last resort from the chosen intervention strategy, then any potential pro…ts > 0 will be evaluated as if = 0. Thus, realizing trading gains is not part of the policy objective. We deem Assumption B as plausible.
While a risky strategy might indeed o¤er potential rewards, especially during a crisis, it is very unlikely that, even if they should realize, such rewards would be assessed as an accomplishment for the lender of last resort. To the contrary, it would be more natural to see the speculative strategy being publicly discussed after an unfortunate outcome.
Our …nal assumption concerns the size of the credit facility that needs to be extended by the lender of last resort to salvage a troubled institution.
Assumption C. The amount of credit c > 0 needed to avert the forced liquidation of a representative seller is strictly less than the market price of the risky asset under market strain, i.e., c < p
Such an assumption would be reasonable when the availability of credit from the lender of last resort induces other stake holders to support the troubled institutions, for instance, by injecting additional funds or by interpreting contractual obligations in a less restrictive way.
We will now compare the three policy options. It is, however, not obvious which metrics to apply. In principle, what we would like to do is to maximize e¢ ciency subject to a constraint on a given level of exposure to market risk.
It turns out that it is more convenient to study the dual problem which is to minimize exposure subject to a given level of e¢ ciency. As a proxy for e¢ ciency, we shall use the price impact in the crisis. Speci…cally, we will consider the consequences, in terms of exposure, for the lender of last resort of securing a price level of v " in the bad state. Thus, in the sequel, we …x " and minimize exposure subject to the constraint p
14 Outright intervention in asset markets. In principle, the lender of last resort could actively trade the asset to reduce the ine¢ cient risk allocation.
Most obviously, the lender of last resort could buy the asset outright in state S at date 1, when the market price is prone to go below fundamentals. Consider a scenario in which the lender of last resort buys q > 0 assets to 14 For simplicity, we will also assume that f + u = 1.
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stabilize prices in the critical state. The equilibrium price in this state would
Keeping the market price at some limit v ", for " > 0 small, below the fundamental value would require buying a quantity
of the asset, where = 2 =2. The uncertain return of such a strategy to the lender of last resort at date 2 would be
We will compare this uncertain return with the return resulting from the other two strategies.
Open market operation.
With an open market operation, the lender of last resort (usually the central bank) o¤ers additional credit to any counterparty eligible to take part in the operation. Note that collateral requirements do not exclude any market participants from the operation. Sellers in distress, for instance, are in possession of the risky asset which can be used as collateral. But also unfunded buyer could obtain liquidity, provided that they pledge the asset to be acquired with the help of the credit to the central bank. Thus, the liquidity o¤ered by the central bank in the open market would be available to all market participants. However, provided that " > 0, which is realistic in our view, we would expect that also buyers take part in the operations. This is because the seller's gain from averting an imminent liquidation corresponds to the di¤erence between market prices at dates 1 and 2, but this is just what the gain would be for a buyer to invest at date 1 and to harvest the return of her investment at date 2! Assume that the lender of last resort o¤ers liquidity l > 0 (i.e., short-term credit) in the money market in state S. Let r MM 0 denote the interest rate to be paid by market participants for the liquidity obtained in the open market operation. We assume that r MM is not to high. Speci…cally, we require " > r MM (v "), so that funds are attractive both for unfunded buyers and sellers.
Each seller seeks c, while unfunded buyers demand p 
As a consequence of the additional buying and selling in state S, the price p S 1 in the market under distress at date 1 would satisfy
Thus, for p For the following ranking of policy alternatives, we have to assume that interest rates are not too high, because otherwise neither buyers nor sellers would …nd it su¢ ciently attractive to take up the credit from the lender of last resort. But then, as illustrated in Figure 2 , we obtain a clear ranking of the three policies in terms of exposure for the lender of last resort. where the inequalities are strict with positive probability.
Proposition 2 suggests a theoretical argument of why, under certain circumstances, it may be preferable to assist institutions in trouble directly than to conduct an anonymous market operation. The reason is the strategic behavior of potential buyers. Just like the distressed sellers, they have a motive for seeking funds when the market price falls signi…cantly under fundamentals.
In the model, this incentive is strict provided that " > 0.
Extensions and robustness
This section treats a number of extensions.
Short-selling. Short-selling can indeed be considered in the model, provided that f < s (not too many buyers in the market, which is not much more restrictive than our assumptions so far). As before we focus on a situation where the perceived risks are high and there is little willingness to invest. Short-selling would mean that a funded buyer repoes the risky asset from a seller (or from a market maker) against cash between date 0 to date 1. The risky asset would be sold in the market at date 0 and bought back by the buyer at date 1. In case that the buyer wishes to buy another unit at date 1, the buyer may submit two market o¤ers (there should be unlimited credit for buyers and sellers within the trading date to make this work).
Short selling has several e¤ects: The e¤ect on precautionary liquidation is always negative in the model. In fact, precautionary liquidations are substituted by short-sales. The selling pressure in the liquidation state S is increased due to a higher population of sellers that have not taken precautionary measures, at the same time the selling pressure is weakened by the buy-backs by the buyers that resolve their short positions. The overall effect balances out in the model. The buying pressure is higher in the nonliquidation state N, because here, the sellers wait (until date 2), while the buyers (who are short) buy, as in state S, twice as much as without shortselling. Welfare is higher with short-selling (should be), because risks are allocated more e¢ ciently.
Moral hazard. We have abstracted so far from the incentive e¤ects of policy regimes for the lender of last resort on commercial bank risk taking.
It is feasible to adapt to model to capture also moral hazard concerning liquidity risk-taking (this requires considering a perfectly divisible asset).
Intuitively, commercial banks may decide …rst about the quantity of liquidity to invest. When a shock occurs, then some banks will be a¤ected, while others are not a¤ected. Banks that are a¤ected would have to liquidate part of their portfolio, while banks that are not a¤ected have funds available for investment in the crisis. In such a scenario, moral hazard is caused likewise by targeted assistance and money market intervention. The reason why money market intervention may cause moral hazard is because of the speculative motive of commercial banks. When it is anticipated that funds will be o¤ered to all market participants, then there is a reduced incentive for prospective speculators to hold transaction liquidity.
Lending at a penalty rate. We have assumed in Proposition 2 that money market intervention happens at moderate interest rates. To see what happens when liquidity is o¤ered at penalty rates, assume that
Under this condition, only sellers in distress would …nd it in their interest to
participate in the open market operation. This suggests an alternative policy option which would be an open market operation in which the interest rate is chosen so that the credit is valuable for the troubled investors, but not for speculators. Given Assumption C, such an interest rate will always exist.
This provides a theoretical argument that is di¤erent from the traditional focus on moral hazard of why a penalty should be imposed on emergency funds, namely to make such funds unattractive for speculators. 15 
Conclusion
When a population of investors fears a future need for liquidation, then it will be rational for some or even for all sellers to liquidate their positions before the actual arrival of the crisis. We have shown that this …nding is robust with respect to the introduction of a population of funded buyers. Precautionary liquidations occur unless the mass of funded buyers in the population at least outweighs the mass of potentially distressed sellers. The rationale behind this …nding is the strategic behavior of buyers. An asymmetry between sellers and buyers is caused by the fact that sellers will hold on in the good state while buyers have to use their only remaining opportunity. This e¤ect renders the ex ante valuation of the asset by the sellers to be higher than the buyers' valuation, which motivates the speculative trading on the part of the buyers.
The extended model allowed us to rank three commonly perceived policy options for the lender of last resort in a situation of market distress. Speci…-cally, we showed that outright intervention in the asset market is an inferior strategy to the provision of short-term credit. Moreover, among the methods of providing short-term funding to a banking system in distress, targeted lending is more desirable for the lender of last resort, at least under the assumptions made in the analysis.
Our results might have a bearing on the recent developments in the context of the subprime crisis. On August 9, 2007, the executive board of the ECB decided to inject EUR 95bn through a …ne-tuning operation. In contrast, the Federal Reserve on August 17 has chosen to o¤er targeted liquidity assistance by lowering the interest charged on discount window lending. Our analysis suggests that as a lender of last resort, the Eurosystem is less risk averse than the Federal Reserve, which would be consistent with perceived di¤erences in central bank independence.
Appendix A. Equilibrium conditions
The trading model allows strategic decisions on dates 0 and 1, where two states (N and S) are feasible at date 1. In the sequel, we describe the equilibrium conditions resulting from individual pro…t maximization for the case u = 0. The adaptations to the general case are straightforward. As sellers have no discretion in case of a liquidity shock (i.e., S 1 = 1 0 ), an equilibrium can be formally described by a vector To constitute an equilibrium, a number of conditions must be satis…ed. 
In the CARA-normal framework, equation (5) is equivalent to
where V [:] denotes the variance. Re-arranging yields the …rst assertion of the lemma. Similarly, the price p ! 1 at date 1 is implicitly given by
Combining (6) with (5) and subsequently applying the rules for the CARAnormal model yields the second assertion, and thereby the lemma. 
In particular, since p
v by Lemma B.6 then :
when s > 0. But then 0 = 1, which is the desired contradiction. To see why the equilibrium is ine¢ cient, assume f < 1, and that (4) is satis…ed. In the second-best allocation, risk-averse market makers hold a zero position in the asset. Only if a liquidity shock occurs, sellers will liquidate. As a mass of f funded buyers stands ready to buy the asset conditional on a crisis, prices at dates 0 and 1 would be p 0 = p
Thus, in the second best, without loss of generality,
By our assumption on zero-rent market making, the market making sector can be left out of the welfare analysis. The expected loss in utility for the sellers caused by ine¢ cient selling would be s (1 f ), where = 2 =2.
For each funded buyer, there is a countervailing utility gain of the same absolute size. As the mass of sellers that transfer their asset to the market making sector is just 1 f , on aggregate, we obtain a welfare of
When a run on the …nancial market occurs, however, a mass
sellers liquidates early, and no market participant buys early, leading to an
This creates a disutility for an early seller of
As sellers are indi¤erent between selling early and selling late, the aggregate utility of the sellers is also given by (7) . The buyers all buy at date 1, with a probability of s at price p S 1 and with probability 1 s at price p N 1 . This yields an expected utility for a buyer of
Aggregating over all buyers and including the sellers yields the third-best welfare
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Compared to the second-best allocation, the loss in welfare therefore amounts
The other two cases are proved analogously. For f = 1, Lemma B.1 below says that the market price for the asset at dates 0 and 1 cannot fall below v.
This is an equilibrium outcome.
Proof. From Lemma B.5 below, we know that
But then
Rewriting yields
From Proposition 1, we know that p 
The tuple (9) is an equilibrium provided that s(2 f ) > 1. 
The strict version of (3) implies
Conversely, when s(2 f ) > 1, then it is straightforward to check that (9) describes an equilibrium.
This behavior is part of an equilibrium provided that s(2 f ) 1. Moreover,
Proof. Assume that p 0 = sp
Combining this with (1) and (2), and subsequently applying f < 1 yields
Because of
, we have proved (10) . There are now two cases, according to whether p 
Moreover, prices are given by
Plugging the explicit expressions for the prices in the no-arbitrage condition (11) and re-arranging yields (10) provided that s(2 f ) 1. Plugging (10) back into the price formulas (13), (14), and (15) delivers
Note that p 
This proves the assertion.
Lemma B.4. p Proof. Assume to the contrary that p Proof. Assume to the contrary that p Proof. Assume to the contrary that p 0 > v. Then, by Lemma 1, there must be more buying than selling at date 0, i.e., 0 > 0 . In particular, 0 > 0.
But early buying is rational only when market participants expect to be able to realize a weakly higher price from date 1 onwards, i.e., when
But then, for at least one state !, we must have that p 
